




Working Paper No. 1282




The research reported here is part of the NBER'S research program
in International Studies and project in Productivity (World
Econonr). Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the National Bureau of Econoxuic Research.NBER Working Paper #1282
March1984
Trade and Structural Interdependence
Between the U.S. and the NICs
ABSTRACT
During the decade since 1973, the U.S. economy has become increas-
ingly interdependent with the newly industrializing countries (NICs)
among the developing countries. These countries have had high invest-
ment ratios to GNP, financed mainly by domestic saving, but also partly
by foreign borrowing. They have invested in manufacturing capacity,
importing capital equipment. This increase in international demand for
equipment has resulted in an increase of U.S. capital good exports to
over 50 percent of all U.S. manufactures. In turn, exports of consumer
manufactures by the NICs to the OECD countries have expanded rapidly.
As the NICs grew during the 1970's, they imported capital goods from the
U.S., and exported consumer manufactures to the U.S. This pattern of
trade has strengthened the interdependence between the U.S. economy and
the NICs.
The geographical pattern of U.S. trade with the NICs shows some in-
teresting asymmetries. U.S. exports are relatively focused on Latin
America, mainly Mexico, and imports on the Far Eastern NICs. A trade
triangle has developed, with the U.S. exporting manufactures, mainly
capital goods, to the Latin American NICs; who in turn sell raw materials
on the world market. The Far Eastern NICs buy raw materials and sell
manufactures, mainly consumer goods, to the U.S. Thus growth in the
U.S. economy has become more interdependent with both the Latin American
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1. Introduction and Summary.
During the decade since 1973, the U.S. economy has become increas—
ingly interdependent with the newly industrializing countries (NICs)among
the developing countries. [See Table 24 for a list of identifiedNICs.]
These countries have had high investment ratios to GNP, financedmainly
by domestic saving, but also partly by foreign borrowing. They have in—
vested in manufacturing capacity, importing capital equipment. This in-
crease in international demand for equipment has resulted in an increase
of U.S. capital good exports to over 50 percent of all U.S. manufactures;
the 12 NICs enumerated in the tables in section 3 of thispaper absorbed
22 percent of all U.S. capital goods exports in 1981.
In turn, exports of consumer manufactures by the NICs to the OECD
countries have expanded rapidly. The 12 NICs provided half of U.S. im-
ports of consumer manufacture (non—food, non—auto) in 1980, and 40 percent
of European imports. As the NICs grew during the 1970's, they imported
capital goods from the U.S., and exported consumer manufactures to the
U.S.
This pattern of trade has strengthened the interdependence between
the U.S. economy and the NICs. In section 3 below we show that U.S. ex-
ports of manufactures are less balanced across commodities than European
or Japanese exports, with high shares in the U.S. for capital goods and
chemicals. The NICs are a major market area for these U.S. exports.
'Support from the NSF Division of Policy Research and Analysis is gratefully
acknowledged.2.
The geographical pattern of U.S. trade with the NICs also shows
some interesting asymmetries. In overall trade in manufactures, the U.S.
has a large surplus ($12.2 billion in 1980) in trade with the Latin
American NICs (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico), a small surplus
($2.5 billion) with the ASEAN countries, and a large deficit ($11.3 bil-
lion) with the Far Eastern NICs (Hong Kong, S. Korea, Taiwan). Thus the
U.S. exports capital goods to the NICs and imports consumer goods from
them, following broad lines of comparative advantage. But the exports
are relatively focused on Latin America, mainly Mexico, and imports on
the Far Eastern NICs. In the data of sections 3—5 a trade triangle ap-
pears, with the U.S. exporting manufactures, mainly capital goods, to the
Latin American NICs; who in turn sell raw materials on the world market.
The Far Eastern NICs buy raw materials and sell manufactures, mainly con-
sumer goods, to the U.S. These patterns of interdependence should be a
major focal point of U.S. foreign economic policy.
The data presented in sections 2—5 below support this view of in-
terdependence between the U.S. economy and the NICs, which differs from
the relations of Europe or Japan with those countries. In section 2 we
begin by describing investment and manufacturing—led growth in the NICs
since 1970 or so. This is part of a broader pattern of growth in manu-
facturing in the developing countries that has left only the African pri—
mary producers dependent on a single primary export. Growth of manu-
facturing capacity, particularly in the NICs, has provided a market for
exports of capital equipment.
In sections 3 and 4 we compare the evolution of the geographical
and commodity composition of manufactures exports and imports of the3.
U.S., Europe, and Japan. The NICs take a high proportion of U.S. and
Japanese exports relative to European exports, with the U.S. relatively
concentrated on capital goods and Latin America. The U.S. is the biggest
market for NIC exports of manufactures, particularly consumer goods.
The pattern of U.S. trade with the industrial NICs, disaggregated
by connnodity, is examined in section 5. There we see the geographical
imbalances mentioned above, which make growth in the U.S. economy inter-
dependent with growth both in Latin America and among the Asian NICs.4.
2. The Rise of the NICs
2.1 Introduction.
During the 1970s the relative size of the manufacturing sector ex-
panded in a broad range of developing countries. In a subset of these
countries in Latin america and Asia, this growth made them significant
producers of manufactures on a world scale by the end of the decade.
This group has been labelled the newly industrializing countries, or NICs.
In this section we analyze some aspects of the rise of the NICs that are
important for the later discussion of their trade interactions with the
OECD countries.
Growth in manufacturing capacity and trade in the developing coun-
tries, which will he documented below, seems to have reduced their tight
dependence on OECD growth. While there is still a strong correlation be-
tween growth rates of industrial countries and the average across all de-
veloping countries, the correlation is less tight when we look at groups
of developing countries. It is no longer clear who is the "engine" and
who is the dead weight in the international growth process.
Growth rate data since 1973 are summarized in Table 1 for areas of
interest for the analysis below. The data for the industrial countries
show the deepening stagnation in the OECD area, especially in Europe.
For example, the West German economic institutes are forecasting a signi-
ficant recover in 1984, with real GDP growing at 2—3 percent, and
ment rising only slowly. In Europe, recovery has been redefined to mean




1973—79 1980 1981 1982
Industrial countriesa 2.8 1.3 1.0 —0.2
Developing countries 5.1 6.1 2.0 1.9
Low—income 5.1 6.1 3.7 3.7
Middle—income oil
importers 5.5 4.2 1.1 1.1
East asia and Pacific










Western Hemisphere 4.9 5.7 —2.4 —1.2
Major exporters of
manufactures b 6.4 4.5 —0.2 0.2
a. All data are averages weighted by real GDP.
b. IMF classification of major exporters of manufactures.
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, Table 2.1.
IMP,AnnualReport, 1983, Table 2.
Table 1:
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all developing countries is roughly similar to that of the industrial coun-
tries, but there are important differences in timing. While the OECD
countries, led by the United States, went deep into recession in 1982,
growth was about the same as in 1981 in the developing countries.
The subgroups of developing countries in Table 1 show a wide di-
versity of growth patterns relative to the industrial countries. The
low—income and the Western Hemisphere countries show a rise in the growth
rate in 1980, and the East Asian and Pacific countries show a sharp rise
in 1981. The middle—income oil importers in the Middle East and North
Africa, and the major exporters of manufactures (the NICs) show an in-
crease in the growth rate in 1982, when the OECD slump deepened. Thus
the pattern of growth among the subgroups of Table 1 does not mirror the
movement in the industrial countries. The increase in growth in the de-
veloping countries relative to the industrial countries in 1982 could
lead us to ask if the rules of engine and dead weight have not been
reversed.
In the rest of this section of the paper, we will look in more de-
tail at the structure of growth in the NICs, the development of the manu-
facturing sector in the NICs and in a broader sample of developing coun-
tries, and the financing of this growth. The facts to be presented are all
well—known by now; the point here is to present them in a way that will
make clear the connection between these developments and the evolution
of the structure of trade between the NICs especially in Asia, and the
OECD countries especially the United States.7.
2.2 Growth in the NICs, 1970—81.
There are about as many lists of which countries are ICs as there
are authors on the topic of their emergence and growth. So we have an
initial problem of identification of countries. There is also in the
background of this literature a deeper question of whether the identifi-
cation has not been done purely on an ex post basis by looking at a narrow
set of indicators related to growth in manufacturing capacity. It is
quite possible that the category NICs does not exist as measured by other
characteristics of the economy. For example, on the "distortion index"
of the World Bank, of the NICs listed in Table 2, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Colombia are in the low—distortion category; Indonesia,
India, Brazil, and Mexico are "middle—distortion" countries; Argentina is
the only "high—distortion" country. [World Development Report, 1983,
P. 60].. Does this grouping imply that we can categorize NICs as relatively
"low—distortion" countries? The answer is not clear. An urgent topic
for research in this area would be on analysis using a "clustering algo-
rithm" grouping countries by a wide range of economic indicators, such as
the entire set of World Bank Indicators, to see if a category "NICs"
emerges statistically.
In the face of these reservations, we must proceed, so I have de-
cided to adopt the list of NICs provided by Cohn Bradford (1982), which
includes countries which are on most lists. Bradford further introduces
the subsets of existing NICs and potential, or "New NICs," as they are
labelled in Table 2. The categories in Table 2 are also broken do.m by
the World Banks groupings by income level. Taiwan is omitted because it8.
no Longer appears in the World Bank data; it is included later in the
analysis of trade data.
The growth rates of real GDP, investment, and manufacturing output
in the NICs are summarized in Table 2 for the period 1970—81. Among the
NICs identified there, the only countries with lower growth rates than
their income—group average were Argentina in all three categories and
Thailand in investment growth. Comparing growth rates across columns,
only Singapore shows slower investment growth than GDP growth, and only
Argentina shows slower growth of manufacturing output than GDP growth.
[Is Argentina already deindustrializing?]
The impression left by the data of Table 2 is of investment—led
growth in the NICs, with manufacturing output growing faster than GDP.
Next we see the effects on the structure of output and exports, and how
this growth was financed.
2.3 The Shift toward Manufacturing.
The increase in the manufacturing sector as a fraction of CDP and,
even more strikingly, of exports among the NICs is shown in Table 3. The
increase in the share of manufacturing in GDP from 1960 to 1981 was
greater than the average for the income group in all of the identified
NICs except Brazil and Argentina, where it actually decreased.
The last two columns of Table 3 show the increase in the share of
manufactures in exports. Here the numbers are striking. Even in coun-
tries where the manufacturing share of output did not rise significantly,
the export share did. Indonesia, whose exports came to be dominated by
oil, in a mild version of the "Dutch disease",is the only country with aTable 2: Growth Rates of GDP, Investment, and Manufacturing












































Hong Kong 9.9 14.1 10.1
Singapore 8.5 7.2 9.7
Brazil 8.4 7.9 8.7
Mexico 6.5 9.0 7.1
Argentina 1.9 2.5 0.7
New NICs
7.8 10.4 11.1
a. Average for low—income countries other than China and India.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983.Manufacturing Output and Exports in the NICs,
1960 and 1980—81.
Groupor ManutacturingOutputasManufacturesExports as





Low income (average)a 9 10 9 29
India 14 18 45 59
Upper middle
income (average) 23 24 16 45
S. Korea 14 28 14 90
Hong Kong 27 — 80 93
Singapore 12 30 26 54
Brazil 26 27 3 39
Mexico 19 22 12 38
Argentina 32 25 4 23
New NICs
Lower middle
income (average) 15 17 4 18
Indonesia (0) 12 0 2
Thailand 13 20 2 29
Philippines 20 25 4 37
Columbia 8 14 2 20
Upper middle
income
Malaysia 9 18 6 19
a.Average for low—income economies other than China and India.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983.
Table 3:
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small increase in the manufacturing share.
This shift toward manufacturing exports is not limited to the NICs,
as we see in Table 4 and Figures 1—4, taken trom James Riedel (1982).
Table 4 shows the evolution of the distribution of non—fuel exports of
the developing countries from 1955 to 1978. Over that period, manu-
factures increased from 10 to 45 percent of developing country exports.
Noting that four Asian NICs——Hong Kong, S. Korea, Singapore and Taiwan——
account for over 60 percent of developing country manufactures exports,
Riedel went on to study a 54—country sample that excludes those four. The
sample was divided into 11 "balanced exporters," 22 non—African pri-
mary exporters, and 20 African primary exporters. The evolution of the
average export structure of the entire sample is shown in Figure 1. The
increase in manufactures share from 7 percent in 1960 to 18 percent in
1976—78 is balanced by the decrease in the share of the largest single
primary export from 47 to 36 percent. The experience of the "balanced
exporters," which include Brazil, India, and Mexico from our list of NICs,
is shown in Figure 2. The manufactures share rises from 15 to 39 percent,
and the largest single primary share falls from 43 to 22 percent. In
Figure 4 we see that the non—African primary producers, which include
Argentina, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand from our list, increased
their manufactures share from 4 to 16 percent, and reduced the largest
single primary share from 46 to 32 percent. Only the African primary
producers, shown in Figure 3, remain heavily dependent on the largest
single primary export. We will see below that this is the main market
among the developing countries for European exports.Structure of Developing Country Exports,
1955—78 (percentages).
Export Category 1955 1960 1970 1978
Total Non—fuel Exports 100 100 100 100
Food 49 47 40 35
Agricultural Raw Materials 28 25 15 10
Minerals, Oils 13 15 18 10
Manufactures 10 13 27 45
Source: Riedel (1982), Table 1, taken from UNCTAD, Handbook of Trade
and Development Statistics, 1972, 1979, 1980.
12.
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The developing countries on average, and especially the NICs, grew
rapidly in the 1970s, even in the face of stagnation in the OECD area.
Investment and manufacturing output grew faster than GDP in the NICs,
and the manufacturing share of output and exports increased substantially.
In later sections of the paper we link this growth in manufacturing out-
put to demand for capital goods exports from the OECD countries, parti-
cularly the U.S.
2.4 Investment, Saving, and Foreign Borrowing.
Rapid growth in investment in the NICs has been associated with re-
latively high shares of investment in GDP, financed partly by high domestic
saving rates and partly by foreign borrowing. The data for 1981 are sum-
marized in Table 5. In the first column we see that among the identified
NICs, only Brazil and Indonesia had investment rates lower than their
group averages. The 25 percent investment share for middle income develop-
ing countries is itself high by international standards.
The second and third columns in Table 5 show how investment in
1981 was financed. The upper middle income NICs, including Malaysia, have
saving rates not much different from the group average of 24 percent.
Singapore is higher and Brazil lower. So this group experienced a higher—
than—average foreign capital inflow, as shown in the last column of Table
5. On the other hand, the lower—income NICs, including India, all have
saving rates much higher than their group average, and lower—than—average










































































a. Average for low—income economies other than China and India.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983.
Table 5:
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The data of Table 5 confirm the impression that the NICs have ex-
perienced high saving rates, around 23 or 24 percent, and even higher in-
vestment rates, grouped around 28 percent or so. The difference has been
financed by foreign investment of around 5 percent of GDP. The main ex—
ceptions are Indonesia, which has on balance been investing abroad, and
Brazil, with lower rates of investment and saving. Thus in general in-
ternational capital has flowed toward countries with high investment
c- i-. _1 • -1-,- MTI' .-,- 1 raLes, LLL.LLL..Ly omeLJ.L..V.LLL5,,LL
The consequences of this pattern of investment—led growth partly
financed by foreign borrowing are summarized in the debt and debt service
data of Table 6. The first two columns show external public and publicly—
guaranteed debt in billions of dollars in 1970 and 1981. The middle two
columns show this debt as a fraction of GDP. The last two columns show
the debt service ratio to export earnings. Since the data covers public
debt only, they seriously understate total national foreign debt in coun-
tries with extensive borrowing by the private sector, such as Brazil and
Mexico.
While Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina do not stand out in the columns
showing debt—GNP ratios, they do stand out in the debt—service data, re-
flecting their lower levels of exports relative to GNP. All of the upper
middle income NICs show increases in the debt—GNP ratio from 1970 to 1980.
among them, Hong Kong and Singapore have markedly low debt—GNP and es-
pecially debt service ratios. Thailand and the Philippines also show in-
creases in both ratios from 1970 to 1981. The exceptions are India, with
a marked decrease in both ratios, Colombia, with debt and GNP growing at
the same rate from 1970 to 1981 and the debt service ratio falling, andTable 6: Extetnal Public Debt and Debt Service Ratios.
17.
Groupor ExternalPublicDebt Debt Service
Country $billion % ofGNP Ratioa
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a.Average for low—income countries other than China andIndia.18.
Indonesia with a falling debt—GNP ratio and a rising debt serviceratio.
It is clear from the data of Table 6 that while in general the
NICs have grown with foreign borrowing, their debt positions in the early
1980s varied significantly, from the low—exposure positions of Hong Kong,
Sinapore, and Malaysia, to the crisis conditions of Argentina; Brazil,
and Mexico. As we see below, U.S.exportsare relatively more oriented
toward.the Latin American NICs, and Japan's toward the Asian NICs.
Thus while the U.S. economy has become more interdependent with the NICs
through trade, the Latin American orientation of its exports leaves it
more sensitive than Europe or Japan to a Latin American debt squeeze.
3. The Structure of OECD Exports.
3.1 Introduction.
During the past two decades, the share of U.S. exports going to the
NICs has increased substantially, while the NICs share of Japanese exports
has remained constant, and the NIC's share of European exports has de-
creased. In the the U.S. case, the NIC's share of each one—digit SITC
category of manufactures exports has risen. By 1981 the NICs absorbed
31 percent of U.S. exports of chemicals and 22 percent of U.S. exports of
capital goods, the two biggest single U.S. export categories. Overall,
by 1981 the NICs share of manufactured exports was 25 percent for Japan,
21 percent for the U.S., 13 percent for OECD Europe, and 9 percent for
the EEC. These data reflect one aspect of the increasing interdependence
of the U.S. and Japanese economies with the rapidly—growing developing
countries, especially as compared with Europe.19.
In this section we summarize the comparative data on U.S.,
Japanese, and European exports to the NICs, especially the Asian NICs.
We begin by looking at the data disaggregated by one—digit SITC group
and destination, and then look at the distribution across commodity
groups of the exports of manufactures of each of the three main OECD
areas.
3.2. Distribution of Total Exports and Total Manufactures
Exports by Destination.
The evolution of exports and their fraction going to the NICs and
the Asian NICs from 1964 to 1981 is shown for OECD Europe and the EEC,
the U.S., and Japan in Table 7 for total exports and Table 8 for total
manufactures exports. Intra—area trade has been excluded from the Euro-
pean data to make them comparable with the U.S. and Japanese data. Thus
EEC exports can be larger than OECD Europe exports because of the exclu-
sion of EEC exports to other European countries from the OECD Europe
data. The EEC here is the Community of nine countries, before the acces-
sion of Greece.
In Table 7 we see that U.S. total exports grew a little less ra-
pidly than Europes from 1964 to 1981. In 1964 the totals for the U.S.
and OECD Europe are nearly equal, but in 1981, U.S. exports were 84 per-
cent of OECD Europe's. The differential growth took place during the
1964—73 period of rapid European growth; the ratio of U.S. exports to
European exports has stayed constant at about 85 percent since 1973.
Japan's total exports have grown much faster than Europe's or those of
the U.S., as is well known. In 1964 Japan's exports were about 25 per-




$ Billion $ Billion % $ Billion
OECD Europe
-
World 25.0 100.0 81.0 100.0 268.3 100.0
NICs 3.7 14.8 9.9 12.2 34.0 12.7
Asian NICs 2.4 9.6 5.5 6.8 21.5 8.0
EEC
World 30.4 100.0 98.1 100.0 295.6 100.0
NICs 3.1 10.2 8.1 8.3 27.5 9.3
Asian NICs 2.1 6.9 6.5 6.6 18.0 6.1
U.S.A.
World 26.1 1OQ.Q 70.2 IQQ.0 225.8 100.0
NICs 4.3 16.5 4.5 16.4 47.1 20.9
Asian NICs 2.4 10.4 5.4 7.7 22.3 9.9
Japan
World 6.7 100.0 36.8 100.0151.9 100.0
NICs 1.6 23.9 9.7 26.4 37.7 24.8
Asian NICs 1.5 22.4 8.6 23.4 33.3 21.9
Source: OECD Data Tape
20.21.
percent in 1981. This growth of Japanese and European exports relative
to the U.S. was a natural result of recovery and development in Europe
and Japan, as discussed in Branson (1981).
More interesting here is the distribution of exports by destina-
tion. The NIC share of OECD Europe and EEC exports fell from 1964 to
1973, and then rose a bit to 12.7 percent for OECD Europe and 9.3 percent
for the EEC by 1981. The NIC share of Japanese exports has remained at
about 25 percent from 1964 to 1981. The NIC share of U.S. exports was
about 16 percent in 1964 and 1973, but grew to 21 percent by 1981. Three
initial observations can be made from the data of Table 7. First, the
shares of European and Japanese exports going to the NICs have remained
roughly constant, low for Europe and high for Japan. Second, the NIC
share of U.S. exports has increased markedly since 1973. Third, about
half the 21 percent of U.S. exports to the NICs go to Asia, the other
half to Latin America.
The distributional pattern of total manufactures exports, shown
in Table 8, is similar to the pattern in Table 7. Comparison of the two
tables shows that in 1981 manufactures account for 95 percent of Japanese
exports, 82 percent of OECD exports, and 71 percent of U.S. exports.
Agriculture and raw materials account for a higher fraction of U.S. ex-
ports than they do in Europe or Japan.
The share of European and EEC manufactures exports going to the
NICs fell from 1964 to 1973, and then rose a bit to 1981. The NEC share
of Japanese manufactures exports stayed at about 27 percent for 1964 to
1973, and fell to 24.4 percent in 1981. The NIC share of U.S. exports






$ Billion $ Billion $ Billion %
OECD Europe
World 21.0 100.0 69.5 100.0 219.5 100.0
NICs 3.5 16.7 9.0 12.9 31.7 14.4
AsianNICs 2.2 10.5 5.0 7.2 19.9 9.1
EEC
World 25.6 100.084.4 100.0241.4 100.0
NIC5 2.9 11.3 7.5 8.9 25.4 10.5
Asian NICs 1.7 7.0 4.3 5.1 16.3 6.8
U.S.A.
World 17.2 100.046.5 100.0160.0 100.0
NICs 2.8 16.3 7.2 15.5 34.9 21.8
Asian NIC5 1.2 7.0 3.3 7.1 14.9 9.3
Japan
World 5.9 100.033.8 100.0144.9 100.0
NICs 1.6 27.1 9.3 27.4 35.4 24.4
AsianNICs 1.5 25.4 8.6 25.4 30.9 21.3
Source: OECD Data Tape
22.23.
tonearly 22 percent by 1981, with nearly half going to the Asian MICs.
The fraction of U.S. manufactures exports going to the incipient
NICs in 1964 was the same as OECD Europe's. But as the NICs grew, the
share of U.S. manufactures exports to them also grew. By 1981 this share
was similar to the NEC share of Japanese manufactures exports, with the
U.S. relatively more concentrated in Latin America, and Japan in Asia.
3.3. Disaggregation of the Distribution of Manufactures
Exports by Destination.
The distribution of manufactures exports by (approximately) one—
digit SITC code is shown in Tables 9—13 for Europe, Japan, and the U.S.
The exact definition of the categories is given in the note to Table 14.
Rather than discuss each table exhaustively, I will attempt to bring for-
ward the major points.
Beginning with chemicals in Table 9, we see that the U.S. and
Europe are major exporters, and Japan is not. The NIC share of U.S.
chemicals exports is twice that of OECD Europe, at 30.9 percent, and
Japanese exports are highly concentrated on the Asian NICs. In Table 10
we see that Europe is the biggest exporter of industrial materials, with
Japan second and the U.S. third. The NIC share of Japan's exports is
high and Europe's low, with both concentrated on the Asian NICs. The NEC
share of U.S. exports is intermediate, and is concentrated on Latin
America.
The important category of capital goods is shown in Table 11. As
the NICs industrialize, they import capital goods. In 1981, U.S. and
European exports of capital goods were about the same——$82.2 billion for24.
Table 9:Distribution of Exports of Chemical Products (SITC 5)
Area or 1964 1973 1981
Country $ Billion $Billion % $Billion
OECD Europe
World 2.8 100.0 9.2 100.0 30.2 100.0
NICs 0.6 21.4 1.7 18.5 4.9 16.2
Asian NICs 0.3 10.7 0.9 9.8 3.3 10.9
EEC
World 3.3 100.011.3 100.0. 34.4 100.0
NICs 0.4 21.1 1.5 13.3 4.1 11.9
Asian NICs 0.2 6.0 0.8 7.1 2.9 8.4
U.S.A.
World 2.4 100.0 5.7 100.0 23.3 100.0
NICs 0.5 20.8 0.9 15.8 7.2 30.9
Asian NICs 0.3 12.5 0.2 3.5 4.2 18.0
Japan
World 0.4 100.0 2.1 100.0 6.8 100.0
NICs 0.2 50.0 1.1 52.3 3.1 45.6
Asian NICs 0.2 50.0 0.9 42.9 3.0 44.1
Source: OECD Data Tape25.




$ Billion $ Billion % $ Billion
OECD Europe
World 5.8 100.0 18.0 100.. 0 52.5 100.0
NICs 0.7 21.1 1.6 8.9 6.7 12.8
Asian NICs 0.6 10.3 0.9 5.0 4.6 8.8
EEC
World 6.9 100.0 21.7 100.0 55.0 100.0
NICs 0.6 8.7 1.4 6.5 5.0 9.1
Asian NICs 0.3 4.4 1.1 5.1 3.3 6.0
U.S.A.
World 3.0 100.0 6.8 100.020.2 100.0
NIC5 0.5 16.7 1.1 16.2 4.3 21.3
Asian NICs 0.3 10.0 0.4 5.9 1.4 6.9
Japan
WorLd 2.7 100.0 10.4 100.0 32.7 100.0
NIC5 0.7 25. 3.7 35.6 10.2 31.2
Asian NICS 0.7 25.0 3.3 31.7 9.0 22.5
Source: OECD Data Tape26.
the U.S. and $84.7 billion for Europe——and Japanese exports were $51.7
billion.
Both the growth since 1973 and the distribution of these exports
are interesting. As we see in Table 14 below, capital goods are 51.4
percent of U.S., 38.6 percent of European, and 35.7 percent of Japanese
manufactures exports in 1981. First, let us compare OECD Europe and the
U.S. In 1973 European capital goods exports were 13 percent greater than
the U.S., and the NIC share of European exports was also greater than
that of U.S. exports. By 1981 European exports were 3 percent greater
than the U.S., and the NIC share of U.S. exports was greater than that of
European exports, with the U.S. relatively concentrated in Latin America.
Now, let us compare Japan and the U.S. In 1973 Japanese exports
of capital goods were 53 percent of the U.S.; by 1981 this ratio rose to
63 percent. Japan's exports remained highly concentrated on the Asian
NICs. The total of NIC share of U.S. capital goods exports grew faster
than that of Japan, but the U.S. also grew more concentrated on Latin
America.
Thus in capital goods exports, U.S. total growth from 1973 to 1981
was slower than Japan's but faster than Europe's. The growth of U.S. ex-
ports to the NICs was about the same as that of Japan, but is significantly
greater than that of Europe. This suggests that the U.S. was maintaining
its competitive position vis—a—vis Japan, and both were improving relative
to Europe in capital goods. But the concentration of the U.S. on the
Latin American NICs, combined with the debt crisis of Argentina, Brazil,
and especially Mexico, provides a serious short—run threat to this other-
wise optimistic assessment of the U.S. position.27.
Table 11: Distribution of Exports of Capital Goods (SITC 7 Less 78)
Area or 1964 1973 1981
Country $Billion % $Billion % $Billion %
OECD Europe
World 7.1 100.0 25.5 100.0. 84.7 100.0
NICs 1.6 22.5 4.3 19.1 15.1 17.8
Asian NICs 1.0 14.1 2.3 9.0 9.0 10.6
EEC
World 8.7 100.0 30.1 1&0.0 89.9 100.0
NICs 1.4 16.1 3.6 12.012.5 13.9
Asian NICs 1.0 11.5 1.9. 6.3 7.9 8.8
U.S.A.
World 7.9 ioa.Q 22.6. 100.0 82.2 100.0
NICs 1.2 15.2 4.0 17.7 18..1 22.0
Asian NICs 0.5 6.2 2.4 10.6 8.0 9.7
Japan
World 1.5 100.011.9 10.0.051.7 100.0
NICs 0.5 33.3 3.0 25..2 14.2 27.5
AsianNICs 0.4 26.7 2.9 24.4 11.9. 23.0
Source:OECD Data Tape28.
Exports of consumder goods are shown in Table 12. Here the U.S.
was a major exporter after World War II, but returned to -its normal posi-
tion of net importer as Europe and Japan grew. This restoration of the
pie—war pattern of trade is described in Branson (1981, 1983). By 1981
Europe was the largest exporter, Japan second, and the U.S. third. The
NIC share of U.S. exports was close to that of Japanese exports, though,
much higher than that of European exports, with the U.S. concentrated on
Latin American and Japan in Asia.
Finally, exports of other manufactured products are shown in Table
13. These include military equipment and automototive products. [Note:
These will be presented separately in the revised version of this paper.]
Here, as in consumer goods, Japan is the largest exporter, followed by
Europe and then the U.S. The U.S., however, has the largest fraction
going to the NICs, heavily concentrated on Latin America. The NIC share
of U.S. exports rose from 1973 to 1981, while their share of European and
Japanese exports fell.
3.4. Distribution of Manufactures Exports by Commodity Group.
The evolution of the distribution of each areas' exports of manu-
factures across commodity group is shown in Table 14. This table gives
the distribution of the totals from Table 7 across the one—digit catego-
ries of Tables 9—13.
The main impression one gets from Table 14 is the relatively static
composition of OECD Europe's and the EEC's manufactures exports from 1964
to 1981, compared especially with the large changes in this composition
for Japan, with the U.S. in between. The share of industrial materialsTable 12:Distribution of Exports of Miscellaneous
Manufactures (Consumer Goods) (SITC 8)


























100.0 20.1 100.0 World
NICs 9.4 2.0 10.0
AsianNICs 6.3 1.3 6.5
EEC
World 100.0 2-3.5 100.0
NICs 5.2 1.2 5.1
AsianNICs 2.6 0.9 3.8
U.S.A.
World 2.7 100.0. 10.0 10.0.0
NICs 0.3 11.1 1.7 17.0
AsianNICs 0.1 3.7 0.6 6.0
Japan
World 2. 100.0. 14.5 100.0
NICs —— 0.5 17.2 2.8 19.3
AsianNICs —— 0.5 17.2 2.5 17.230.
Table 13: Distribution of Other Manufactured Exports
(including Autos) (SITC 9 plus 38)
Area or 1964 1973 1981
Country $Billion % $Billion % $Billion
OECD Europe
World 3.3 100.0 10.4 100.032.0 100.0
NICs 0.4 12.1 0.8 7.7 3.0 9.4
Asian NICs 0.3 9.1 0.5 - 4.8 1.7 5.3
EEC
World 4.4 IQci.ct 13.6. 100.0. 38.6 100.0
NICs 0.4 io.a0. 4.4 2.6 6.7
Asian NICs 0.2 4.5 Q.3 2.2 1.3 3.3
U.S.A.
World 2.6 IQO.0. 8.7 100..024.3 100.0
NICs 0.5 19.2 0.9 10.3 3.6 14.8
Asian NICs 0.1 3.8 0.2 2.3 0.7 2.9
Japan
World 0.5 IUO.0. 6.5 100.039.2 100.0
NICs 0.2 40.0 1.0 15.4 5.1 13.0
Asian NICs 0.2 40.0 1.0 15.4 4.5 11.5
Source: OECD Data Tape31.
(SITC 6) in OECD exports fell from 27.6 percent in 1964 to 23.9 percent
in 1981, while the share of capital goods (SITC 7) rose from 33.8 percent
to 38.6 percent. The other categories remained roughly constant.
The composition of U.S. manufactures exports is dominated by a
high and rising share of capital goods (STTC 7), from 45.9 percent in
1964 to 51.4 percent in 1981. The shares of industrial materials (STETC 6)
and consumer goods (SITC 8) fell across this period.
The structure of Japanese manufactures exports shows major changes
in all categories from 1964 to 1981. The biggest changes are the contin-
uous rise in the share of other manufactures (mainly autos) (SITC 9), the
jump in the share of capital goods (SITC 7) from 25.4 percent in 1964 to
35.2 percent in 1973, with a much slower increase after 1973, and the de-
crease in the share of industrial materials, which dominated the distri-
bution in 1964.
Comparison of the structure of manufactures exports in 1981 across
the three major areas shows Japan with a significantly lower share in chem-
icals (SITC 5), and higher share in other manufactures (mainly autos)
(SITC 9) than the U.S. or Europe, and the U.S. with a significantly higher
share in capital goods (SITC 7) than Europe or Japan. In a sense, rela-
tive to the other areas, Japan seems to be specializing in SITC 9, and
the U.S. in SITC 7, with no single commodity group standing out in OECD
Europe or the EEC.Table 14: Distribution of Manufactures Exports by
Commodity Group
32.
Areasor 1964 1973 1981
Country $ billion % $billion $billion %
Source: OECD Data Tape
Note: Percentages may not total to 100 due to
Definitions of Commodity Groups on SITC Revision 2:
SITC 5: Chemicals and related products
SITC 6: Manufactures classified chiefly by material, i.e. industrial
supplies and materials. SITC 676 (rails and railway track),
692 (metal containers), 695 (tools for hand or machine use),
were subtracted from SITC 6 and added to.SITC 7
SITC 7: Capital goods. SITC 676, 692, and 695 were added. SITC 775
(domestic electrical equipment) and 78 (road vehicles) were
subtracted from SITC 6 and added to SITC 9. SITC 87 (pro-
fessional, scientific, and controlling apparatus) was sub-
tracted from SITC 8 and added to SITC 7
SITC 8: Miscellaneous manufactured goods (mainly consumer manufactures)
SITC 87 was moved to SITC 7
SITC 9: Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified plus
SITC 775 and 78. This is also military equipment plus autos.
OECD Europe
Total 21.0 100.0 69.5 100.0 219.5 100.0
5 2.8 13.3 9.2 13.2 30.2 13.7
6 5.8 27.6 18.0 25.9 52.5 23.9
7 7.1 33.8 25.5 36.7 84.7 38.6
8 2.0 9.5 6.4 9.2 20.1 9.2
9 33.3 15.7 10.4 .15.0 32.0 14.b
EEC
Total 25.6 100.0 84.4 100.0 241.L 100.0
5 3.3 12.9 11.3 13.4 34.4 14.2
6 6.9 26.9 21.7 25.7 55.0 22.7
7 8.7 34.0 30.1 .35.7 89.9 37.2
8 2.3 9.0 7.7 9.1 23.5 9.7
9 4.4 17.2 13.6 16.1 38.6 lb.0
Us
Total 17.2 100.0 46.5 100.0 160.0 100.0
5 2.4 13.9 5.7 12.2 23.3 14.6
6 3.0 17.4 6.8 14.6 20.2 12.6
7 7.9 45.9 22.6 48.6 82.2 31.4
8 1..3 7.6 2.7 5.8 10.0 6.3
9 2.6 15.1 8.7 18.7 24.3 15.2
Japan
World 5.9 100.0 33.8 100.0 144.9 100.0
5 0.4 6.8 2.1 6.2 b.8 . 7
6 2.7 45.8 10.4 30.8 32.7 22.6
7 1.5 25.4 11.9 35.2 51.7 5
8 0.8 13.6 2.9 8.b 14.5.
9 0.5 8.5 6.5 19.2 39.2 27.
rounding error33.
3.5 Conclusion.
In Table 11 we saw that a high and rising share of U.S. capital
goods exports goes to the NICs. This share reached 22 percent in 1981,
with 9.7 percent going to the Asian NICs, and 11.3 percent to Latin America.
Then in Table 14 we saw that U.S. exports of manufactures are dominated by
capital goods exports to a degree that no one—digit commodity reaches in
Europe of Japan. By l98l over half of U.S. exports of manufactures
were capital goods.
Thus rapid growth and high levels of investment in the NICs have
been associated with rapid growth and concentration in U.S. exports of
capital goods, and this association seems strongest with the Latin Ameri-
can NICs. This has contributed to an increasing interdependence of the
U.S. economy with the NICs, an interdependence that could have important
implications for U.S. foreign economic policy.34.
4. The Structure of OECD Imports.
4.1. Introduction.
There have been two striking developments (aside from OPEC) in the
structure of OECD imports from the leading developing countries in the two
decades since 1964. The first has been the change in the structure of
European and U.S. imports of manufactured goods, mainly away from indus-
trial supplies nd materials and toward consumer goods, capital goods, and
automotive products. The other has been the rise of the NICs, especially
since 1970, as the source of manufactured imports to Europe and the U.S.
This has been most striking in consumer goods, where the NICs provided
nearly 40 percent of European imports and 50 percent of U.S. imports by
1980.
As is well—known, the level of Japanese manufactures imports re-
mains low relative to the U.S. and Europe. Basically, the Japanese eco-
nomy exports manufactures and imports non—manufactures due to its rela-
tively poor resource base. Fully 95 percent of Japanese exports are man-
ufactures, but only 21 percent of Japanese imports. Comparable numbers
for the U.S. are 70 percent on the export side and 55 percent on the im-
port side. However, the fraction of Japanese and U.S. total manufactures
imports coming from the NICs are almost the same, a bit over 20 percent.
As on the export side, the proportion of European manufactures imports
coming from the NICs is smaller, under 15 percent in 1980.
The evolution of total imports, total imports less fuel, and total
manufactures imports, and their distribution by source, is shown in35.
Tables 15—17 for OECD Europe, the U.S., and Japan. [Note: Tables 15—23
will be up—dated to 1981 and to include EEC in revision. The import
tape was not available when this was written.]. The total import data
are sufficiently influenced by oil prices since 1973 that we will begin
by focusing on Table 16, which gives total imports less fuel.
In Table 16, we see that U.S. and Japanese imports grew much
faster than European imports from 1964 to 1973. Then from 1973 to 1980
growth rates were much more equal, with European imports growing fastest
and the U.S. slowest. The fraction of European non—fuel imports coming
from the identified NICs rose slowly throughout the period to 17.3 per-
cent 1964—80. The share of the NICs in U.S. imports was constant for
1964 to 1973, and then increased significantly to 23 percent by 1980.
The share of the NICs on Japanese non—fuel imports increased rapidly
over the entire period, reaching 40 percent by 1980. In contrast to the
export data, on the import side at this level of aggregation, both Europe
and the U.S. imports from the NICs are relatively more concentrated on
Asia than are the Japanese.
The data on total manufacturing imports are summarized in Table
17. There we see the difference between the levels of imports of Europe
and the U.S., and of Japan. However from 1964 to 1980, Japanese manufac-
tured imports grew at the same rate as those of the U.S.; in 1964 their
ratio is 0.21, by 1980 it was 0.22. European manufactures imports grew
faster, though, especially after 1973. The ratio of European to U.S. man-
ufactures imports rose from 0.79 in 1964 to 0.8.1 in 1973, and then jumped
to 1.05 in 1980.36.
Table 15: Distribution of Total Imports.
1964 1973 1980 Area or _______________ _______________ _______________
Country $Billion $Billion $Billion %
CECD Europe
World 36.1 100.0 98.2 100.0373.0 100.0
NICs 4.2 11.6 12.0 12.2 4i.0 11.0
Asian NICs 2.1 5.8 6.1 6.2 25.5 6.8
U.S.A.
World 18.6 100.0 69.5 100.0 250.3 100.0
NICs 2.9 15.6 11.0 15.8 50.9 20.?.
Asian NICs 1.4 7.5 6.8 9.8 32.1 12.8
Japan
World 7.9 100.0 38.1 100.0 139.9 100.?
NICs 1.1 13.9 8.1 21.2 31.4 22.
Asian NICs 0.9 11.4 7.8 20.5 28.4 20.3
Source: OECD Commodity Series C.Table 16: Distribution of Total Imports Less Fuel (SITC 3)
Areaor 1964 1973 1980
Country $billion % $billion % $billion
OECD Europe
World 29.5 100.0 75.2 100.0 223.1 100.0
NICs 4.2 14.2 12.0 16.0 38.7 17.3
Asian NICs 2.1 7.1 6.1 8.1 25.3 11.3
U.S.A.
World 16.6 100.0 61.3 100.0 168.0 100.0
NICs 2.7 17.5 10.8 17.6 38.7 23.0
Asian NICs 1.4 8.4 6.6 10.8 26.7 15.9
Japan
World 6.5 100.0 29.8 100.0 69.6 100.0
NICs 1.0 15.4 6.4 21.5 27.9 40.0
Asian NICs 0.8 12.3 6.1 20.5 15.2 21.8
Source: OECD Commodity Series C




$ Billion $ Billion $ Billion %
OECD Europe
World 7.6 100.038.2 100.0142.9 100.0
NICs 0.6 7.9 3.7 9.7 20.9 14.6
Asian NICs 0.6 7.9 3.3 8.6 18.4 12.9
U.S.A.
World 9.6 100.046.8 100.0t36.2 100.0
NIC5 0.6 6.3 6.8 14.5 27.4 20.1
Asian NICs 0.5 5.2 5.1 10.9W 21.5 15.9
Japan
World 2.0 100.0 11.7 100.0 30.4 100.0
NICs —— 1.8 15.4 6.3 20.7
Asian NIC5 —— 1.7 14.5 5.0 16.4
Source: Conimodity Series C
38.39.
The proportion of manufactures imports coming from the NICs has
increased over time in all three areas, with the biggest increase in
Japan, especially from 1964 to 1973, and the smallest in Europe. By 1980,
roughly 20—21 percent of U.S. and Japanese manufactured imports came from
the NICs, as compared with 15 percent of European imports. Again, incon-
trast to the export pattern, all three areas' imports of manufactures from
the NICs are concentrated in Asia, relative to Latin America.
4.3. Disaggregation of the Distribution of Manufactures
Imports by Origin.
The distributions of manufactures imports for the one—digit SITC
categories are shown in Tables 18—22. The categories are the same as for
exports; details are given in the note to Table 14.
Chemical imports, summarized in Table 18, are small, with the
largest total $14.6 billion in Europe in 1980. Relative to the other
areas, the U.S. has a higher proportion coming from the Latin American
NICs, and Japan from the Asian NICs, but the numbers are small. Imports
of industrial supplies are summarized in Table 19. There we see low num-
bers for Japan relative to the other areas, with a high concentration on
the Asian NICs. By 1980 Europe was a bigger importer than the U.S., but
they had similar contributions. Table 20 summarizes the distribution of
imports of capital goods. The world totals are similar to those of in-
dustrial supplies, with OECD Europe imports in 1980 of $48.6 billion,
compared to $37.8 billion for the U.S., and $8.7 billion for Japan.
There is a significant difference in the distribution by source, however,
both across importing areas in Table 20, and by comparison with indus-





$ Billion $ Billion % $ Billion %
OECD Europe
World 1.3 IGO.0 4.2 1O.0. 14.6. i0o.0
NICs —— ——- —— —— 0.4 2.7
AsianNICs —— —— —— -— 0.i_ 0.7
U.S.A.
World 0.7 IQO.Q2.5 100..0 9.Q lao. C
NICs —— —— —— —— 0..5. 5.5
AsianNICs —— —— —— —— 0..1 1 .I
Japan
World 0.5 ioo.a1.9 100.0 5.9 100.0
NICs —— —— —— —— 0.5 8 .5
Asian NICs —— —— —— 0.4 6.8
Source:OECD Commodity Series C.
40.Table 19:Distribution of Imports of Industrial Supplies and
Materials other than Fuel, (SITC 6)
Area or
Country
1964 1973 1980 $ Billion % $ Billion % $ Billion %
OECD Europe














World 4.5 100.01.3.0 100.0-33.5 100.0
NICs 0.4 8.92.0 15.45.7 17.0
Asian NICs 0.3 6.71.4 10.84.2 12.5
Japan
World 0.6 10.0.0.4.5 100.09.7 100.0
NICs —— —— 1.2 26.7 2.7 27.8
Asian NICs —— —— 1.1 24.4 2.3 23.7
Source: OECD Commodity Series C
41.42.
Table20: Distribution of Capital Goods Imports. (SITC 71
Area or 1964 1973 1980
Country $Billion $Billion $Billion
OECD Europe
World 0.4 100.0 12.3 100.0 48. 100.0
NICs 0.3 2.4 3.8 7.8
AsianNICs —— 0.3 2.4 3.5 7.2
U.S.A.
World 1.5 100.0 11.2 ioa.o37.8 i00.C
NICs —— 2.1 18.8 8.4 22.2
Asian NICs —— 1.4 12.5 6.1 16.
Japan
World 0.8 100.0 3.1 100.0 8.7 100.0
NICs 1.5 17.2
Asian NICs -— 0.7 8.0
Includes $0.7 billion from Argentina in 1980.
Source: OECD Commodity Series C43.
comparison with industrial supplies in Table 18. In 1980, 22 percent of
U.S. imports of capital goods came from the NTCs, 16 percent from Asia.
The proportions for Europe and Japan are much smaller, with the Japanese
share for Latin America all coming from Argentina. [Note: We are check-
ing the data to see if this is a good observation] .TheU.S. is a much
bigger importer of capital goods from the NICs, especially in Asia, than
are Europe or Japan.
The distribution of consumer goods imports is shown in Table 21.
Here the total imports are smaller than for industrial supplies or capital
goods, but the concentration on the NICs, especially in Asia, is much
stronger. Out of roughly equal total consumer goods imports of $23—24
billion in 1980, nearly half of U.S. imports and 40 percent of European
imports come from the NICs, mostly from Asia. The U.S. share has risen
much more rapidly over time than the European share. U.S. and European
imports of consumer goods from the NICs are greater than any of the other
one—digit categories as a result of this concentration. Japan also has
a relatively high share of consumer goods imports from the Asian NICs,
but out of a very small total.
Imports of the other category, which includes arms and autos, are
summarized in Table 22. Here we see the relatively high level of U.S.
imports in 1980, and the rapid growth of both European and U.S. imports
over the entire period since 1964. The NIC shares of these imports are
very small, however. NIC exports of manufactures to the OECD countries
are concentrated in industrial supplies, capital, goods, and especially
consumer goods, with very small NIC export participation in chemicals
or autos.Table 21:Distribution of Imports of Consumer Goods




$ Billion $ Billion $ Billion
OECD Europe
World 0.9 100.0 5.3 100.0 23.9 100.0
NICs 0.3 33.3 1.7 32.0 9.5 39.7
Asian NICs 0.3 33.3 1.7 32.0 9.3 38.9
U.S.A.
World 1.5 IOQ.Q 7.& laO.0 2.3.3 100..
NICs 0.2 13.3 2.5 32.9 11.4 48.9
Asian NICs 0.2 13.3 2.2 28.9 10.3 44.2
Japan
World 0.1 100.Q 1.8 100.G 4.5 100.0
NICs Q.6 33.3 1.5 33.:
Asian NICs 0.6 33.3 1.5 33.3
Source: OECD Commodity Series C
44.Table 22: Distribution of Imports of Conunodities




1964 1973 1980. $ Billion % $ Billion % $ Billion
OECD Europe
World 0.4 1011.02.4 100.014.0 10.0.0
NICs —— —— -— 11.5 3.6
Asian NICs -— —- -— —— 0.3 2.1
U.S.A.
World 1.4 1110.0 .12.5 100.0. 32.6. 1011.0
NICs —— —— 0.2 1.6. 1.4 4.
Asian NICs —— —— 0.i 11.8 0.8 2.3
Japan
World 0.0 Q.4 100.0 1.6 100.0
NICs —— —— —— 0.1 6.3
Asian NICs —— —— —— 0.1 6.3
Source: OECD Commodity Series C
45.46.
4.4 Distribution of Manufactures Imports by
Commodity Group.
The distributions across commodity groups are given in Table 23.
Here the main impression is of change in the structure of manufactures
imports over time in Europe and the U.S., and stability in Japan, at
least since 1973. By 1980 the U.S. structure was more "balanced" than
that of Europe or Japan. The distributional peaks are 34 percent in
European capital goods imports, 32 percent for industrial supplies in
Japan, and 29 percent for industrial supplies in Europe and capital goods
in Japan. (Remember that in all cases the Japanese totals are relatively
small.)
In Europe, the major movement has been away from imports of in-
dustrial supplies, with a share falling from 60.5 percent in 1964 to
29.3 percent in 1980, and to a lesser extent chemicals, where the share
fell from 17.1 percent in 1964 to 10.7 percent in 1973. The biggest in-
crease in import share in Europe came in capital goods, from 5.3 percent
in 1963 to 34 percent by 1980. Smaller but significant increases came in
their shares of consumer goods and other (auto) imports.
In the U.S., the main shifts in the structure of manufactures im-
ports came between 1964 and 1973. In this period the share of industrial
supplies fell from 46.9 to 27.8 percent, while the share of capital goods
rose from 15.6 to 23.9 percent, and that of other manufacture (autos)
rose from 14.6 to 26.7 percent. Since 1973 the composition of U.S. man-
ufactured exports has been relatively stable, and more balanced across
categories than in Europe or Japan.47.
Table 23: Distribution of Manufactures Imports by Conunodity Group
Area or
Country
1964 1973 180. $ Billion % $ Billion % $ Billion %
OECD Europe
Total 7.6 100.038.2 100.0l42. 100.0
5 1.3 17.1 4.1 10.7 14.61 10.2
6 4.6 60.514.1 36.9 4.1.8 29.3
7 0.4 5.312.3 32.2 48.6 34.0
8 0.9 11.85.3 13.9 23.9 16.7
9 0.4 5.3 2.4 6.3 14.0 9.8
U.S.A
Total 9.6 100.0.46.8 100.0136.2 100.
5 0.7 7.32.5 5.3 9.0 6.6
6 4.5 46.913.0 27.833.5 24.6
7 1.5 15.611.2 23.937.8 27.8
8 1.5 15.67.2 16.2 23.3 17.1
9 1.4 14.6 12.5 26.7 32.6 23.9
Total 2.0 100.0 11.7 100.0 30.4 100.0
5 0.5 25.0 1.9 16.2 5.9 19.4
6 0.6 30.04.5 38.5 9.7 31.9
7 0.8 40.03.1 26.5 8.7 286
8 0.1 5.01.8 15.4 4.5 14.8
9 0.0 —— 0.4 3.4 1.6 5.3
Japan
Source: OECD Conunodity Series C.
Note: Totals may not all due to rounding48.
4.5 Conclusion.
Among the OECD areas, Europe and the U.S. are the major importers
of manufactured goods, and thus the principal potential markets for the
NICs. In Table 17, we se that while European total manufactures imports
exceed those of the U.S. in 1980, U.S. imports from both Latin American
and Asian NICs—.-$5.9 and 21.5 billion respectively——are greater than those
of Europe. The U.S. is the largest importer of manufactures from the
NICs, especially in Asia, of the three main OECD areas.
Despite the relatively balanced structure of U.S. imports across
commodities, the concentration on the NICs as a source, especially in
consumer goods but also in capital goods, gives this result. In 1980, the
shares of consumer goods imports in U.S. and European total manufactures
imports were about the same, 17.1 and 16.7 percent respectively. But the
U.S. concentration on the NICs, with a 48.9 percent share of the U.S.
market, compared to 39.7 in Europe, resulted in U.S. imports from the
NICs of $11.5 billion in consumer goods. This was the largest single
NIC export category to an OECD area in 1980. The $10.3 billion of Asian
NIC consumer good exports to the U.S. was the largest single category for
that sub—group in 1980.
Thus on the side of NIC exports of manufactures to the OECD, the
U.S. is the largest importer, in spite of (a) a larger import total in
Europe, and (b) more balance of U.S. imports across commodities. This
imbalance in U.S. imports in favor of the NICs as a source adds to the
impression of a growing interdependence of the U.S. economy with the NICs,
as an exporter, mainly of capital goods mainly to Latin America, and an
importer of consumer goods, mainly from Asia.49.
5. U.S. Trade with the NICs.
The previous sections of this paper have compared the trade pat—
terns of the U.S., Japan, and Europe with the NICs, both Asian and Latin
American. Here we focus in more detail on the structure of U.S. trade by
one—digit SITC category with the individual NICs.
First, in Table 24, we show the evolution of total U.S. manufac-
tures trade by commodity group from 1973 to 1980. The data in nominal
terms can be seen in Tables 14 and 23. In 1973 U.S. manufactures exports
were $46.5 billion, and imports $46.8 billion——almost exactly balanced.
In 1980, exports had increased to $149.4 billion and imports to $136.2
billion, for a surplus of $13.2 billion. But much of that increase was
inflation, so in Table 24 we show that the data deflated to 1973 prices.
The surplus on overall manufactures exports, in real terms, went from
zero to 6.8 billion (1973 prices) by 1980. Over a period when the U.S.
economy grew by about 2.5 percent per year (on average) in real terms,
manufactures exports grew by 9.8 percent a year, and manufactures imports
grew by 8.6 percent per year. This is hardly a picture of a "deindus—
trializing" economy; rather it reflects a rapid change in the structure of
U.S. industrial production, with export sectors drawing resources from
shrinking, import—competing sectors.
The structure of U.S. trade in manufactures with the NICs in 1980
is shown in Table 25. There the countries are separated between the
Asian and Latin American NICs, and within each group, the NICs and the
"new NICs." At the bottom we present an ASEAN aggregate——Singapore,







Chemicals (SITC 5) 5.7 2.5 14.1 5.6
Industrial Supplies
(STTC 6)
6.8 13.0 13.4 20.7
Capital Goods
(SITC 7)
22.6 11.2 43.7 22.8
Consumer Goods
(SITC 8)




8.7 12.5 14.1 21.0
Total 46.5 46.8 92.1 85.3
Sources:1. OECD Data Tape and Commodities Serices C for trade
data in current dollars.
2. Council of Economic Advisers Annual Report, 1983 for
price indexes as follows:
Chemicals and Industrial Materials:
Total Goods Deflator, Tables B—7 and 8
Capital Goods: Deflator for Producers' Durable
Equipment, Table B—3
Consumer Goods: Deflator for Consumer Expenditure
on Durables, Table B—3
Autos: Auto Product Deflator, Tables B—7 and 8.
50.51.
each of the one—digit SITC categories, and for the total. The balance on
the upper right—hand corner of the table is the $13.2 billion surplus al-
ready mentioned. The first row shows the structure of U.S. world trade
in manufactures: surpluses in chemicals and capital goods, deficits in
industrial materials, consumer goods, and "other."
Let us focus first on the differences in trade patterns with the
Latin American and Asian NICs. In aggregate, U.S. trade with the Asian
NICs follows the broad pattern of U.S. world trade, except for balance in
SITC 9. But with the Latin American NICs, the U.S. has a surplus in
every category except consumer goods, where trade was balanced. Overall,
the U.S. had a deficit in manufactures trade of $6.3 billion with the
Asian NICs, and a surplus of $12.2 billion with the Latin Americans.
Mexico alone provided a $6.9 billion surplus to the U.S. in 1980, the
largest component being capital goods. This highlights the exposure of
U.S. trade to the debt situation in Latin America.
Another interesting distinction appears when we separate the Asian
NICs into ASEAN and the Far Eastern countries of Hong Kong, S. Korea, and
Taiwan. In 1980 the Far Eastern NICs had an aggregate surplus of $9.3
billion in trade in manufactures with the U.S., while ASEAN had a $2.5
billion deficit, compared with the Latin American deficit of $12.2 billion.
On balance, the U.S. exports manufactures to Latin America, the Latin
American NICs sell non—manufactures (especially Mexican oil) into the
world market, the Far Eastern NICs buy non—manufactures and sell manufac-
tures to the U.S. A similar triangle could be drawn between the U.S.,
ASEAN, and the Far Eastern NICs, with Indonesian oil replacing Mexican.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as U.S. export markets, and the U.S. as an export market for the Far
Eastern NICs.
The data of Table 25 thus show interesting patterns of imbalance
in U.S. manufactures trade both across commodities and geography. Fol-
lowing its lines of comparative advantage, the U.S. is a major exporter
of capital goods, chemicals, and military equipment, and importer of in-
dustrial materials, consumer goods, and autos. Net exports to the NICs
alone provide half the U.S. surplus on chemicals and one—quarter on
capital goods; the Asian NICs, mainly the Far Eastern ones supply three—
quarters of the U.S. deficit on consumer goods. U.S. trade in manufac-
tures has become increasingly interdependent with the three groups of
NICs——Latin America, ASEAN (plus India), and Far Eastern. The patterns
of interdependence are complicated, and will require increasing atten-
tion from U.S.foreigneconomic policy.54.
References:
Bradford, C. (1981), The Role of LDC—NICs in World Economic Adjustment,
niimeo, Yale University Concilium on International and Area Studies.
Branson, W. H. (1981), Trends in U.S. Trade and Investment Since World
War II, in M. Feldstein (ed), The American Economy in Transition
(University of Chicago Press).
_____________(1983),The Myth of Deindustrialization, Regulation
v. 7, No. 5.